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Introduction
Over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the phe-
nomenon known as ”predatory lending.”  In a forthcoming paper,1 we
argue that predatory lending emerged when market incentives that his-
torically led lenders to engage in credit rationing gave way to a market
where lenders could easily exploit unsophisticated borrowers.  Our spe-
cific focus is on the home loan market, i.e., closed-end mortgages
secured by first or subordinate liens on borrowers' homes.
This executive summary of the paper proceeds in three parts.  In the
first section, we identify six problems associated with various lending
practices that have been characterized as predatory. We efine preda-
tory lending as a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that
involve one or more of these six problems.
In the second part, we describe information asymmetries that for-
merly led to credit rationing.  We then identify how changes in the
financial services market have altered the conventional home mortgage
market.  In particular, we argue that an increase in the amount of capi-
tal available for mortgages, increased incentives for lenders to special-
ize in lending to low-and moderate-income borrowers, and opportuni-
ties for deception — a result, in part, of securitization — have enabled
predatory lenders to thrive.
Our thanks to the conference participants, as well as participants at the Cleveland-Marshall
Faculty Colloquium, for their invaluable suggestions and comments. This project received 
generous support from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. Any errors are ours alone.
+ Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
++ Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
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In the final part, we evaluate remedies for predatory lending, includ-
ing the effect of proposed and extant remedies on the availability of
capital for home mortgages.  In conclusion, we propose that the feder-
al government draw on the suitability requirement that applies to the
sale of securities and impose a similar obligation on lenders and bro-
kers.  We argue that suitability achieves the balance between the need
to curb predatory lending and the need to encourage beneficial 
market activity.
”Predatory Lending” Defined
Predatory lending is a direct outgrowth of the emergence of the sub-
prime loan market in recent years.  In an overwhelming number of
cases, predatory loans form a subset of subprime loans, which are loans
with higher interest rates and fees designed for borrowers with impaired
credit, who cannot qualify for loans in the prime market.  
To date, predatory lending has not been adequately defined.
Arriving at a definition of predatory lending is important for two dis-
tinct reasons.  First, legitimate subprime loans play a crucial role in
expanding credit to low- and moderate-income borrowers.  T  avoid
impinging on legitimate credit, the dividing line between legitimate
subprime loans and predatory loans must be defined.  Second, any seri-
ous attempt to formulate remedies for predatory lending must be able
to describe the loans that require redress.
To date, predatory lending most often has been described as a cat-
alogue of onerous lending practices, which are targeted at vulnerable
populations and often result in devastating personal losses, including
bankruptcy, foreclosure, and the loss of one's home.  (e.g., Sturdevant
and Brennan).  When these practices are examined, six basic problems
emerge.  We can thus define predatory lending as a syndrome of abu-
sive loan terms or practices that involve one or more of the following
six problems:
(1) loans that violate common loan underwriting norms to the 
detriment of borrowers;
(2) loans that result in no net benefit to the borrower;
(3) loan terms designed to earn supranormal profits;
(4) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices;
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(5) loans involving other misleading nondisclosures that are never-
theless legal; and
(6) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Predatory loans involve at least one of the above six factors.  In con-
trast, legitimate subprime loans do not display any of the six markers of
predatory loans.  
Market Segmentation and Predatory Lending
What explains the rapid growth in predatory lending?  As we will now
describe, changes in the financial services market and incentives for
increased lending to low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers have
altered the conventional home mortgage market.  We gue that a sur-
feit of capital available for mortgages, new incentives for specialized
LMI lending and opportunities for deception — resulting from a surge
in securitization and a new class of naive borrowers — have made it
possible for predatory lenders to thrive.
The Conventional Theory of the Market for Home Mortgages
In a market with full information, we would expect that the price of a
loan would reflect the risk presented by the borrower. The eality, how-
ever, is that lenders do not have full information about the risk that bor-
rowers will default, the costs of foreclosure if they do default, and the
net amount recoverable in the event of foreclosure.  As a result, lenders
cannot accurately identify borrowers who present the greatest risk and
cannot price loans accurately based on risk.
Twenty years ago, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) recognized that this
lack of information creates an adverse selection problem that prevents
the market for mortgages from clearing.  The key to this adverse selec-
tion problem is that high interest rates deter borrowers who are less
risky and more risk-averse and attract the less risk-averse and riskier
borrowers. Thus, if lenders raise interest rates, the proportion of loan
applicants who present elevated risks of default will rise.  
Given that lenders cannot identify less risky borrowers and that
high interest rates will deter the very borrowers whom they seek to
attract, lenders set the price of loans below the market-clearing rate.
Lenders further reduce their risk by limiting the amount that borrowers
can borrow; this has the effect of deterring risky borrowers.   As a result
of this credit rationing, the demand for loans exceeds the supply and not
all creditworthy applicants can obtain loans (Brueckner 2000).
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Changes in the Financial Services Market
Until the late 1980s, the home-mortgage market behaved as Stiglitz and
Weiss predicted: there was essentially one market for home mortgage
loans and demand exceeded supply.  Beginning in the 1980s, several
changes in the financial services market led to a significant increase in
the supply of capital available for lending and spurred the emergence of
lenders who were willing to lend to people who, historically, had been
credit-constrained. 
One of the most dramatic changes in the financial services market
has been the advent of the securitization of home mortgages.
Securitization is the process of converting packages of home mortgages
into securities and selling the securities to investors.  Wid pread secu-
ritization began in the 1980s and by 1993, 60 percent of home mortgage
loans were securitized.  It is now routine for lenders to originate loans
and sell them on the secondary market, which provides a steady stream
of capital to lend.
In addition to generating additional capital for lending, securitiza-
tion created opportunities for nonbank lenders to enter the home mort-
gage market.  Lenders no longer need to be large financial institutions
with significant deposits and capitalization.  Rather, mortgage bankers,
finance companies, and home improvement contractors with minimal
assets can originate loans for sale on the secondary market. 
Many of these new lenders specialize in subprime lending to low-
and moderate-income borrowers.  There are a number of reasons for
this.  First, prime lenders do not have a significant presence in LMI
neighborhoods, so there is less competition.  Second, LMI borrowers
historically have had limited access to mortgage capital because of
credit rationing.   Hence, there is unmet demand in LMI neighborhoods.
Third, many homeowners in LMI neighborhoods, just as in the rest of
the country, experienced a rise in the value of their homes, and, there-
fore, their equity in the 1990s.  Fourth, there has been an increase in
homeownership among people with lower incomes.
Another factor that encouraged subprime lenders to focus on LMI
lending was the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and
Soundness Act, which authorized the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to establish affordable housing lending goals for
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.  The 1996 to 1999 goals issued pursuant
to the Act required that 42 percent of Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's
loan purchases come from low- and moderate-income households.
The goal for 2000 was 48 percent and for 2001, it was 50 percent.
159Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy
Additional goals require that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac significant-
ly increase their purchases of loans from high minority and/or low-
income census tracts.
Two other pieces of legislation — the Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) and the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) — encouraged lending in LMI neighborhoods.  AMTPA
expanded the types of products that lenders could offer, thus making it
possible for LMI borrowers to obtain loans with terms that meet their
credit needs.  The CRAprovides incentives for banks and thrifts to pur-
chase subprime loans containing predatory terms in order to improve
their CRAexamination ratings and prospects for merger approval.  In
addition, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance creates
incentives for lending in LMI neighborhoods by reducing the cost to
lenders of default.
The changes in the financial services market, including the incen-
tives for lending in low- and moderate-income communities, further-
more have created opportunities for deception by market participants.
Securitization makes deception possible because the various entities
involved in lending and securitization do not share the same knowledge
about borrower's risk nor the same commitment to accurate risk assess-
ment.  This enables lenders and brokers to withhold information to the
detriment of other participants.
Nonbank lenders who sell loans on the secondary market often use
mortgage brokers to market and arrange loans.  These brokers have lit-
tle incentive to insure that borrowers are creditworthy because they do
not bear the risk of loss in the event of default.  Brokers do, however,
have an incentive to deceive lenders regarding borrowers' ability to pay.
This is because lenders typically compensate brokers only for loans that
the lenders approve, based on the size or interest rate of the loans.
When lenders do not have accurate information regarding borrowers'
credit risk, they may agree to loan terms that borrowers cannot afford,
which ultimately can result in default by the borrowers.
Principal-agent problems also arise because lenders have greater
access than securitizers to information about borrowers' creditworthi-
ness and securitizers rely on lenders' assurances about credit quality.
Given that lenders' earnings are based on fees and not interest, their
incentives to maintain credit quality are low relative to those of the
securitizers.  This information asymmetry and reduced commitment to
creditworthiness creates incentives for lenders to approve loans and
include loan terms that generate fees without regard to the risk that the
borrowers will default. 
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Finally, separate information asymmetries occur between LMI bor-
rowers and lenders and brokers.  Lenders and brokers have extensive
knowledge about mortgage products and loan terms.  In contrast, LMI
borrowers, many of whom have been excluded from the home mort-
gage market because of credit rationing, are relatively unsophisticated.
Thus, LMI borrowers may not be aware of alternative sources of capi-
tal and may not be able to comprehend the information that brokers and
lenders provide them regarding loan terms.
Disincentives for Legitimate Lenders and Brokers to Engage in Predatory Lending
The costs to banks and thrifts of predatory lending are significant and
clearly exceed the costs that predatory lenders incur.  Banks and thrifts
are community institutions with valuable reputations that may not be
worth sacrificing to pursue predatory lending.  They may perceive that
even legitimate subprime lending and the consequent increase in fore-
closure rates could damage their reputations.2 In c trast, predatory
lenders are less concerned about their reputations because they can
readily dissolve and reincorporate under different names.
Banks and thrifts, for the most part, do not have a significant pres-
ence in LMI neighborhoods.  As a result, they have limited opportuni-
ties to develop relationships with LMI borrowers at retail sites or to
obtain valuable information on the social capital in LMI communities.
If banks wanted to target customers for predatory loans, they would
need to establish or, in some cases, re-establish branch banks in LMI
neighborhoods.  The cost of establishing new offices likely would out-
weigh any profits they could realize from predatory lending.  In con-
trast, predatory lenders do not have the same brick and mortar costs.
They can operate out of storefronts or solicit borrowers door-to-door
without the need for retail office space.
Banking regulations that mandate loan loss reserves and require
adequate capitalization create further obstacles to banks that want to
expand into predatory lending.  If banks and thrifts begin charging LMI
borrowers high interest rates, bank examiners likely will view the loans
as a risk to safety and soundness and will require the banks to increase
their loan loss reserves.  In addition, federal banking regulators have
tightened capital requirements for subprime loans and they are expect-
ed to tighten those requirements even further.  Nonbank predatory
lenders, in contrast, are not subject to federal loan loss reserve or capi-
talization requirements.
Banks are also less able to develop the special underwriting expert-
ise that LMI lending requires.  LMI borrowers often present elevated
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risks of default and are less likely than more affluent borrowers to have
credit histories that fit neatly into banks' underwriting standards.  As a
result, lenders who want to serve LMI borrowers need special expertise
in evaluating their creditworthiness.  Banks and thrifts are ill equipped
to develop this expertise because their function is to provide diverse
services, from deposit taking to commercial and personal lending.  This
diversification makes it unlikely that banks and thrifts profitably could
develop an expertise in predatory lending.  In contrast, predatory
lenders can afford to specialize.  By focusing on one class of borrowers
— higher-risk borrowers — predatory lenders can better develop meth-
ods for obtaining and evaluating credit information on this group 
of borrowers.
The racial composition of the neighborhoods that predatory lenders
target is disproportionately people of color. To the extent that banks
have an aversion to lending to people of color that outweighs any mar-
ket incentives, they will refuse to lend in these areas.  In contrast, preda-
tory lenders target people of color precisely because discrimination, as
well as credit rationing, have prevented these borrowers from having
access to capital.
Finally, banks and thrifts are reluctant to lend in neighborhoods that
are economically unstable.  Predatory lenders are less concerned about
economic stability because they are willing to pursue foreclosure
aggressively, which enables them to recover their investments before
prices drop too far.
Competition Among Predatory Lenders
Although credit risk explains the market segmentation that has given
rise to the prime and subprime markets, it does not explain the seg-
mentation of the subprime market into legitimate and predatory lend-
ing.  Arguably, competition among predatory lenders should result in
loans with the same terms that legitimate subprime lenders would offer.
This has not happened.  Our hypothesis is that predatory lenders target
LMI borrowers who, for reasons discussed below, do not “shop” for
alternative sources of mortgage capital and do not negotiate over terms.
If this is true, then predatory lenders compete with each other solely for
access to the borrowers whom they target.   We thus posit that the mar-
ket for predatory loans is characterized by spatial, monopolistic com-
petition.  (Frank 1991).
Many LMI borrowers may not be aware of the increased availabil-
ity of mortgage capital for LMI lending.  This lack of awareness, when
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coupled with pent-up demand because of credit rationing, makes them
easy prey for predatory lenders who can readily convince them that
their opportunity to borrow is fleeting.  These borrowers, unaware of
other options, desperate for money and fearful that the prospective
loans will disappear, will not “shop” for other loans. Predatory lenders
and brokers can take advantage of this false urgency and move quickly
to commitment and closing on predatory loans.
Some LMI borrowers are simply unable to explore all their lending
options.  They may be infirm or feel that it is not safe to venture far
from their homes.  They may not have phones or, even if they have
them, may find it difficult to understand people over the phone.
Likewise, they often lack transportation to the offices of legitimate
lenders. Predatory lenders, who solicit potential borrowers with phone
calls and door-to-door solicitations, have ready customers among peo-
ple who are isolated.  They endear themselves to these borrowers with
charm and solicitude that mask their guile and convince the borrowers
that they can meet their lending needs. 
LMI borrowers are further handicapped by their lack of experience
with legitimate mortgage lenders.  They may find it difficult to under-
stand the terms of loans, especially predatory loans, which are notori-
ous for lack of transparency. The  may not know where to seek help in
understanding loan documents and identifying the important questions
to ask lenders.  Predatory lenders can take advantage of their lack of
sophistication and insert loan terms that would be unacceptable to more
experienced borrowers.  In the end, borrowers sign documents without
a clear sense of the terms of the contracts, how much they borrowed,
what they have purchased, or the repayment terms.  
Predatory lenders identify potential borrowers by reviewing statis-
tical data and public records and by familiarizing themselves with the
neighborhoods that they intend to target.  Predatory lenders can use
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to identify areas in
which there is minimal or no lending activity by prime lenders.  They
can also use census data to find neighborhoods with high percentages
of people of color and LMI residents, who historically have been
rationed out of the market and may desire to borrow money.
Municipal offices are sources of individual level information about
residents.  Predatory lenders can learn the names of homeowners from
registries of deeds.  Title records will also reveal any mortgages and the
dates that they were recorded.  From this information, predatory lenders
can surmise how close homeowners are to paying off any outstanding
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mortgage debt and, therefore, the likelihood that there is equity in their
property to tap.  From the local tax office, predatory lenders can obtain
information on the appraised value of properties and learn the identities
of any homeowners who owe outstanding taxes and, therefore, may be
in the market for loans.  In communities that have ordinances requiring
homeowners to maintain the exteriors of their homes, predatory lenders
can learn who has been cited for violations and, thus, may be in need of
money for home repair loans.  They can drive through neighborhoods
and identify homes with sagging porches, aged roofs and peeling paint.
Armed with the names of homeowners, the amount of equity they have
in their homes, any outstanding tax bills or housing code violations they
have and the conditions of their homes, predatory lenders approach the
borrowers and offer their services.  The borrowers, eager to take advan-
tage of what appears to be a “dream come true,” look no further.
Remedies
Neither the states nor the federal government (with the exception of
North Carolina and to a lesser extent Illinois, Massachusetts and New
York) have comprehensive laws to redress predatory lending.  Rather,
victims of predatory lending currently must rely on a loose assortment
of statutes and common law that were not designed to require predato-
ry lenders to internalize the costs of the harm they cause.  Under the
current stable of remedies, predatory loan contracts are generally
enforceable except in the case of discrimination or where fraud or
nondisclosure has operated in some way that is inimical to free will.
Barring discrimination, fraud or nondisclosure, however, the law nor-
mally does not question the substance of predatory loan terms.
Remedies Under Contract Law and the Uniform Commercial Code
Because predatory loans are contracts in the form of promissory notes
and security agreements, contract law might be expected to provide
recourse for victims of predatory loans.  Various contract law doctrines,
however, make it difficult for borrowers to challenge their loan agree-
ments as void.
Most defenses to enforcement of contracts go to defects in the for-
mation of assent, not to disparities in bargaining power or the fairness
of substantive terms.  The most important exception to that rule, for
purposes of predatory lending, is the defense of unconscionability.  In
the seminal case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
defined unconscionability to mean “an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 
The doctrine of unconscionability has limited utility, however, for
victims of predatory lending.  Courts have been reluctant to condemn
excessive price terms as unconscionable.  Furthermore, most courts
only recognize the doctrine as a defense to suits for contract enforce-
ment.  Consequently, borrowers may not sue lenders affirmatively for
damages or other relief based on unconscionable provisions in their
loan agreements.  Finally, under the Uniform Commercial Code, sec-
ondary market purchasers of predatory loans can cut off the defense of
unconscionability (and many other contract defenses) where they qual-
ify as holders in due course.  Thus, when applicable, the holder in due
course doctrine permits secondary market purchasers to evade respon-
sibility for most misconduct by loan originators and eliminates an
important incentive for the secondary market to police loan originators.
Antifraud Laws
Numerous predatory loans are the result of some form of fraud.
Nonetheless, the limited scope of common-law fraud often precludes
redress, either civilly or through criminal prosecution.  Common-law
fraud requires proof of affirmative misrepresentations and thus does not
protect against misleading omissions or manipulation.  In addition, for
victims who want to press charges, criminal fraud prosecutions depend
on the district attorney's willingness to prosecute.  For victims who seek
civil redress, mandatory arbitration provisions and inadequate attor-
neys' fee provisions often raise insuperable barriers to suit.  Finally, the
need to prove individual reliance in fraud cases often makes it difficult
to bring class actions.
In response to these inherent limitations in common-law fraud,
Congress and the states passed unfair and deceptive acts and practices
(UDAP) statutes.  However, the federal counterpart, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, does not afford a private right of action.  State UDAP
statutes do provide private rights of action, but some state UDAP
statutes exclude credit transactions.  Other state UDAPstatutes have
weak attorneys' fee provisions that discourage the private bar from
bringing state UDAPclaims.
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Disclosure
Several federal statutes, including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the
Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA) and the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), mandate the disclo-
sure of standardized price information on loans.    All three statutes,
however, are flawed in what they require and the relief that they pro-
vide.  TILAhas not lived up to its goal of standardizing disclosures as
to the total cost of credit.  RESPA suffers from deficient private
enforcement and poorly thought-out provisions on the timing of disclo-
sures.  HOEPA's advance disclosure provisions are better crafted, but
HOEPA's narrow coverage makes it easy to evade.
Fine-tuning federal disclosure provisions is no panacea.  Most vic-
tims of predatory lending already find the current set of disclosures
complicated and confusing.  For naïve borrowers, piling on more dis-
closures would not help.  The high-pressure nature of loan closings only
exacerbates this confusion, by discouraging borrowers from reading
loan documents at closing or asking questions when they do.  Thus,
more disclosure is not the answer.
Consumer Education and Consumer Counseling
Consumer education and/or counseling are another proposed response
to the problem of exploitative loan terms.  Currently, however, govern-
ment-sponsored credit counseling is virtually non-existent and con-
sumer education programs are in their infancy. There are serious ques-
tions about the efficacy of counseling, particularly for consumers with
educational or cognitive deficiencies.  There is a more basic problem
with relying on education and counseling: education and counseling
mistakenly put the onus of avoiding predatory loans on potential vic-
tims, rather than on the perpetrators.
Price Regulation
Usury limits for residential mortgages in the United States were large-
ly deregulated through federal legislation in the 1980s.   More recently,
predatory lending has fueled calls to reimpose usury limits on interest
rates and points and fees.  Numerous studies, however, including stud-
ies by Bowsher (1974), Jaffee and Russell (1976), McNulty (1979),
Nathan (1980), Ostas (1976), and Phaup and Hinton (1981), have con-
cluded that price controls hurt the very individuals they are designed to
serve by restricting the flow of legitimate credit.  Accordingly, any
attempt to regulate predatory lending should avoid price controls.
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Antidiscrimination Remedies
Two federal statutes — the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 — prohibit lending discrimination on pro-
hibited grounds, including race, color, national origin, and gender.
Both statutes authorize private damages actions.  Only a paucity of pri-
vate cases has been litigated under either statute, however, due to the
high standards of proof, costly expert statistical analysis and low dam-
ages awards.  Furthermore, federal lending discrimination laws are nec-
essarily tangential in their approach, because they address discrimina-
tory treatment rather than abusive loan termsper se.
Suitability
In contrast to the remedies previously discussed, which have limited
utility in terms of stemming predatory lending, we propose taking a
direct approach that goes to the heart of predatory lending - i.e., abus ve
loan terms and practices.
Given the shortfalls in the current set of remedies, an effective rem-
edy must accomplish several things.  It must create effective disincen-
tives to refrain from predatory loans and must force predatory lenders
and brokers to internalize harm.  It must outlaw predatory practices in
such a way that the law is understandable, violations can be easily
proven, and lenders and brokers cannot evade the law.  It must avoid
price regulation and other constraints on legitimate subprime loans.  It
must compensate victims for losses and grant loan reformation.  And it
must furnish the private bar and victims with adequate incentives to
bring predatory lending claims.
In devising such a remedy, we take a leaf from the suitability doc-
trine in federal securities law.   In its general form, a duty of suitability
in mortgage lending would have three components.  Under that duty,
lenders and brokers would be prohibited from selling subprime loans:  
(1) that exceeded individual customers' risk thresholds; 
(2) to borrowers who qualified for prime rates; and/or,
(3) that contained oppressive mandatory arbitration clauses.
If the duty of suitability is appropriate for financial instruments that
have been the traditional province of the affluent and the middle class,
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it is appropriate for financial instruments that are peddled to the poor-
est rung of society.  Such a duty would counteract the current financial
incentives of lenders and brokers to exploit information asymmetries
among market participants.  In essence, a duty of suitability would pro-
vide the disincentive to predatory lending that credit rationing histori-
cally provided before the rise of the subprime market. 
To avoid impinging on legitimate credit, we recommend vesting the
Federal Trade Commission with authority under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission to define the precise requirements of the
duty of suitability through regulation.  To ensure adequate enforcement,
we further recommend amending Section 5 to add a private right of
action for predatory lending, in addition to the Federal Tr a d e
Commission enforcement that now exists.
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Notes 
1 The Law and Economics of Remedies for Predatory Lending (latest draft available
at http://www.law.csuohio.edu/handbook/predatorylending.pdf).
2 Ironically, depository institutions may have a veiled presence in the predatory lend-
ing market.  Some banks and thrifts, whose direct lending is legitimate, have sub-
sidiaries or affiliates that engage in predatory lending. Although the disincentives 
to engaging in predatory lending are greatest for banks and thrifts, several of the 
disincentives, including reputational concerns, also apply to legitimate subprime
lenders.
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